| Bundled runtime configuration | Exact chain, pool, deployment block, verifier, selector, codehash, RPC, and artifact pin | An attacker can redefine the runtime the client expects | Reviewed bundle and deployment provenance are still required |
| Proving manifest | Raw bytes capped and checked against independently bundled SHA-256 before parsing | Wrong or missing pin blocks trusted loading | Full frontend compromise can replace manifest and pin together |
| Trusted setup record | Capped and hashed bytes; status, supersession, deployment, verifier, codehash, and input order checked | Invalid records stop artifact loading | Ceremony quality and approval provenance need separate review |
| WASM and zkey | Capped bytes and exact manifest-bound hashes | Substitution or oversized payload is rejected | Correct bytes can still encode an unsound or wrongly reviewed relation |
| Browser and dependencies | Local witness handling plus verifier self-check before submission | Secret material, recipient, or displayed state can be stolen or altered | Origin and software supply-chain security remain external controls |
| Wallet | EIP-712 chain and pool domain, canonical encoding, recovered signer, and transaction confirmation | Malicious prompts can expose recovery authority; different valid signature bytes can break wallet-only recovery | Wallet software, prompt review, and signature reproducibility remain trusted; an optional bearer note remains an independent fallback |
| RPC | Chain check, runtime reads, bytecode, complete deposit logs, roots, spent state, fee state, and receipt reconciliation | Lag, omission, or manipulation can hide recovery records or show stale state | Independent endpoint diversity, authenticated event history, and finality policy are operational choices |
| Relayer | Exact endpoint, pool and selector allowlist, zero value, deadline, and proof-bound calldata | Key compromise can disrupt service or submit allowed calls | Availability, funding, and private key custody remain private operational facts |
| Pool and verifiers | Proof verification, nullifier rejection, fee bounds, and accounting | Contract or deployment flaw can lose or lock ETH | Audits, formal evidence, deployment review, and governance controls stay necessary |
| Operator process | Approval, release, key custody, monitoring, and incident response | Private control failure can undermine an otherwise correct release | Unpublished operational evidence remains private |
